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1	Wed 21/12/2016	Project team web mail	D-Y project team staff: I submit this inquiry and have a number of questions about the Dec. 11 th fire. Below is today's article from the Oshawa Express. Compare that with the statements about the shutdown in Covanta's media release (MR) dated Dec. 14 th .	Thank you for your interest in the Durham York Energy Centre. Please be advised that your inquiry has been received and is currently being addressed by the Project Team. Once prepared, we will provide you with a detailed response to your inquiry. Regards, Project Team	Wed 21/12/2016	DL
			The Covanta MR identified Air Cooled Condenser as causing the shutdown – see highlighted text in MR. Durham Region staff incinerator update reports from June 2015 J-40 (page 4 2 nd para) and January COW-1-2016 (top of page 3) – both reports referenced issues with the Air Cooled Condenser so this is hardly a "new" problem.		Thurs 16/02/2017	DL
			So far, the public has learned that Covanta has their investigator, the insurance company most likely has theirs and the Owners have apparently retained someone, however, as of last week, there was NO independent fire official accountable to the public e.g. Fire Marshal or a Fire Department investigating the complete incident i.e. what led to the shutdown that caused the situation that resulted in the fire.	Please find below responses to the questions posed to DYEC project team staff on Wednesday December 21, 2016. Q1: Has any fire official been requested to conduct an		
			Has any fire official been requested to conduct an independent investigation e.g. from a Fire Department or Fire Marsha's Office and if so, when would that report be expected?	independent investigation (December 11, 2016 fire) e.g. from a Fire Department or Fire Marshal's Office and if so, when would that report be expected?		
			While it could make sense to have automatic shutdown system(s) that triggers in case one or more of the measurement points in the system reaches an unacceptable level, the questions are: 1) what was the specific trigger in this case and b) surely there must be system data generated that provides such information to	The Clarington Fire Department responded to the fire and they have advised the Regions that they do not intend to investigate further. Q2: While it could make sense to have automatic		
			and b) surely there must be system data generated that provides such information to the operators either in real time or thereafter. An automatic system like that should have a log file.	shutdown system(s) that triggers in case one or more of the measurement points in the system reaches an unacceptable level, the questions are:		
			Does such a log file about this incident exist and have the owners and/or MoECC requested it? The log file should be examined by a trusted and independent third party e.g. Fire Marshal or electricity generation engineers but not any party associated with the incinerator industry.	What was the specific trigger in this case? The facility was temporarily disconnected from the local power and the trigger in this case?		
			Even if Covanta were to claim that this is proprietary information, surely the owners legal team has ensured the owners have rights to do their own due diligence,	grid due to a planned power outage by Hydro One Networks and was running on self-generated power from the Turbine Generator. This is a design scenario referred to as "island"		

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#			especially around matters of public safety and potential impacts to the natural environment. Covanta has a commercial interest in getting up and running as soon as possible after an incident, but this should not occur without the express permission of the regulator -MoECC and the owners. Who gave permission to Covanta on December 11 th to restart Boiler 1 and prior to the December 14 th Boiler 2 restart, and if provided by either MoECC and/or Owners, the relevant documents should be posted to the project website. Reading in the Oshawa Express that the incinerator operates with a hole in the roof prompts question -when will the roof repairs be done? Has MoECC has been informed about post fire developments including results of any of the investigations? Why did no one from MoECC attended the fire December 11 th , though they did attend a much smaller and less complex fire incident on October 11 th and according to media reports from that time, MoECC stayed for the duration of that fire event? Given few hard facts have been provided to the public so far, when will the Regions' investigator's report be complete and made public? Do the Regions expect the report findings would shed light on this clearly unplanned system shutdown and the relationship of same to this roof fire?	mode". When the plant operates in island mode, excess steam that is not required for generating in-house power bypasses the turbine generator and goes directly to the Air Cooled Condenser (ACC). This increases the steam load on the ACC above typical operating levels. These higher steam loads were considered during design and are within the design parameters of the ACC. Due to the cold winter weather, the ACC was also operating in "freeze protection mode". When operating in freeze protection mode, the speed of the cooling fans are periodically reduced to prevent the ACC from freezing. During this particular Island-mode event, with the increased ACC demand, when one of the four (4) fans reduced speed, the speed of the other three (3) fans increased to carry the additional steam load. At the colder ambient temperature and higher fan speeds, a situation was created that resulted in overloading and tripping the fans. With the ACC fans tripped, the ACC pressure increased and the Turbine Generator shut down automatically (as per the intended design) to protect the equipment. This occurred after being disconnected from the power grid and operating in the Island mode for approximately ninety (90) minutes. The combination of the Turbine Generator shut down and the plant being disconnected from the power grid resulted in the	-	Staff
			If not, when would such an investigation be conducted and by whom, one that could also suggest what steps all parties should take to ensure that Covanta's systems have been thoroughly investigated/challenged so as to understand what happened December 11 th in particular, and one that would provide guidance around all possible steps by all parties (regulator, owners, operator) to prevent a repeat of this incident?	plant going "black". The plant backup generator automatically engaged to provide emergency power to shut down the facility. These two "fail safes" (turbine shutdown and emergency generator start-up) initiated in accordance with plant design and the approved Emergency Plan.		
			With this latest incident not fully understood never mind resolved, going into the extended holiday period with even fewer eyes on the burner is a worry. So far, no one has gotten hurt in the two fires and everyone has just been lucky so far. The owners and regulator in particular have a duty to ensure that the public, the	Two actionable items have been implemented as a result of this incident: (1) The ACC control system logic has been modified to automatically adjust (reduce) the fan speed limits during periods of cold weather, when the ACC is in the "freeze protection mode". This will prevent future similar trips; and (2)		

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			incinerator staff and all attending fire fighters have good information and would be protected to the fullest extent possible. Furthermore, Durham should provide data to support their December 11 th media release statement: As well, the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change was advised of the situation and that there were no releases to the environment." The Dec. 11 th CEMS webpage has been revised from what was displayed during the fire incident and for several days thereafter, during which time there were no entries for a period, which prompts my question, what information did the Regions rely on when providing the above information to MoECC? What has MoECC's response been to this incident, if any, and when will that information be posted to the project website? The Owners and MoECC owe the public detailed explanations — minus the political massaging in Durham's media releases - and provide all information about the fire immediately, including those signed up to receive project notifications. Please indicate when I might expect at least a partial reply to questions that could be answered before the start of the holidays i.e. by Dec. 23 rd .	An operating procedure is being modified and related training is being completed as an additional safeguard to further protect against a future re-occurrence. 2) An automatic system like that should have a log file. Does such a log file about this incident exist and have the owners and/or MOECC requested it? The Facility's Distributed Control System (DCS) logs process information. The conditions leading to the ACC trip were logged and used as the basis of the root cause investigation. Q3: Who gave permission to Covanta on December 11th to restart Boiler 1 and prior to the December 14th Boiler 2 restart, and if provided by either MOECC and/or Owners, the relevant documents should be posted to the project website. Boiler #1: The December 11th fire was limited to the area above Boiler #2 and was deemed to have no operational impact to Boiler #1. Covanta, as the Operator, initiated the start-up of Boiler #1 after receiving the all-clear from the Clarington fire department. Boiler #2: The initial assessment of the fire damage at the Durham York Energy Centre (DYEC) was completed by JADE+, an engineering consultant hired by the operator Covanta. Their report confirmed that damage was limited to a small area of the roof, with no damage to the main structural components of the roof or the rest of the facility. Based on these findings, Covanta, as the Operator, initiated the start-up of Boiler #2 boiler and returned to full operating capacity.		

Inquiries Method Response **Date Comment Details/Description: Response/ Remedial Action** Staff Received Received **Date** Q4: When will the roof repairs be done? The report prepared by Covanta's consultant concluded that the fire started where the steam pipe penetrates the roof deck, when the insulation and rubber roofing membrane caught on fire. The report also determined that the repairs will require the replacement of some damaged roof deck material. An evaluation and redesign of the boiler venting pipe penetrations through the roof is currently underway. The work will be scheduled and completed after the final design has been reviewed by the Owner's. Until the final modifications are made, a temporary patch has been provided to keep weather out of the building. Q5: Has MOECC been informed about post fire developments including results of any of the investigations? The MOECC District Office has been provided with an explanation of the event and what led to the fire. They were satisfied with the explanation. Q6: Why did no one from MOECC attended the fire December 11th, though they did attend a much smaller and less complex fire incident on October 11th and according to media reports from that time, MOECC stayed for the duration of that fire event? Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MOECC) staff and the afterhours Spills Action Centre was contacted during each event and the MOECC decides when/if their attendance is required. The MOECC did not attend the December 11th fire, however,

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				they did follow-up with DYEC staff the following day. The fire was extinguished soon after the MOECC was notified of the incident and therefore, initiating the Ministry's after-hours Environmental Response Program was not warranted. The Ministry also considered the severity/significance of the incident in making its decision to not attend on December 11, 2016. None of the MSW stored in the facility was in jeopardy of catching on fire due to this roof fire. Q7: When will the Regions' investigator's report be complete and made public? In addition to the independent consultants hired by Covanta to investigate the boiler vent piping design and prepare proposed improvements, the Region has hired an independent consultant specializing in these investigations to prepare a root cause analysis report regarding the December 11, 2016 fire. The Region's consultant will also review the proposed redesign prior to final approval. Once an approved design is accepted by the Owner's a full report on the findings and repairs will be made public. Q8: Do the Regions expect the report findings would shed light on this clearly unplanned system shutdown and the relationship of same to this roof fire? If not, when would such an investigation be conducted and by whom, one			
				that could also suggest what steps all parties should take to ensure that Covanta's systems have been thoroughly investigated/challenged so as to understand what happened December 11th in particular, and one that would provide guidance around all possible steps by all parties (regulator, owners, operator) to prevent a repeat of this incident?			
				The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) for the unplanned system shutdown has been completed and submitted to the Regions.			

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				Based on the RCA and the action items stemming from the RCA, the Regions and the Regions' technical consultant HDR are of the opinion that the cause of the trip has been identified and mitigated.		
				During the event, a steam vent line that was relieving pressure from the boiler created a high temperature zone in an area where the steam line passes through the boiler house roof deck. This caused the roofing material to ignite and a small fire on the boiler house roof ensued.		
				After the incident, the roofing material near ALL of the vent lines was inspected and monitored to prevent a reoccurrence of this event after boiler startup. The design and installation of the roof penetration for the steam vent line has been investigated and is being modified.		
				Q9: "The Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change was advised of the situation and that there were no releases to the environment." What information did the Regions rely on when providing the above information to MOECC? What has MOECC's response been to this incident, if any, and when will that information be posted to the project website?		
				As noted in our response to Question #3, damage to the facility was confined to a small area on the roof in the proximity of the steam vent. The plant's air pollution control equipment and other systems continued to operate until the plant was shut down.		
				Best Regards,		
				Project Team		

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2	Thu 29/12/2016	Project team web mail	I'm inquiring about both DYEC boilers presently being off line, with shutdown for both beginning sometime after 8 pm on December 28 and still being off-line as of 3 pm today (December 29). Because of so many problems and shut-downs during the year, and also the recent fire (Dec. 11) at the facility, I'd like information on why both boilers are down last night/today. Do you have any idea of when they will be back on-line?	Thank you for your interest in the Durham York Energy Centre. Please be advised that your inquiry has been received on January 3 rd and is currently being addressed by the Project Team. Once prepared, we will provide you with a detailed response to your inquiry. Regards, Project Team	Tue 03/01/2017	DL
			As a resident of Courtice, I'm aware that each start-up and shut-down can result in higher emissions during that time, and since we are not allowed to see emission data during start-up or shut-down, there is always cause for concern as we don't know how high emissions may be during those times. Please provide any information you can on this event. I would also like to know whether a cause for the auto-shutdown before or during the fire on December 11 has been found, and if so, what is it? If not, is the investigation continuing? Regards	RE: Follow-up from questions received on Thu 29/12/2016 Good Morning, Please find below responses to the questions posed to DYEC project team staff on Thursday December 29, 2016. Q1: I'm inquiring about both DYEC boilers presently being off line, with shutdown for both beginning sometime after 8 pm on December 28 and still being off-line as of 3 pm today (December 29). Why are both boilers down last night/today? An unscheduled maintenance outage occurred on December 28-29, 2016. Because the repair work involved the main steam pipe that is common to both boilers, it required both boilers to be taken offline so the steam line could be safely secured and isolated from any steam. Additional downtime was required to allow the piping to cool to a safe temperature for workers to complete the repairs. Events like this are common in a functioning plant as parts wear. The operating contract anticipates up to 10% down time annually due to scheduled and non-scheduled maintenance.	Thurs 15/02/2017	DL

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				Q2: Do you have any idea of when they will be back online? Both Boiler #1 and Boiler #2 were back on-line on December 29, 2016. Q3: I would also like to know whether a cause for the auto-shutdown before or during the fire on December 11 has been found, and if so, what is it? If not, is the investigation continuing? The facility was temporarily disconnected from the local power grid due to a planned power outage by Hydro One Networks and was running on self-generated power from the Turbine Generator. This is referred to as "island mode". When the plant operates in island mode, excess steam that is not required for generating in-house power bypasses the turbine generator and goes directly to the Air Cooled Condenser			
				(ACC). This increases demand on the ACC above normal levels. Due to the cold winter weather, the ACC was also operating in "freeze protection mode". When operating in freeze protection mode, the speed of the cooling fans is periodically reduced to prevent the ACC from freezing. This created a control logic conflict between island mode, which increases the heat load on the ACC, and freeze protection mode, which causes the ACC to retain more heat. As a result the ACC fans overloaded, and the Turbine Generator shut down automatically to protect the equipment approximately ninety (90) minutes into the power outage.			

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				The plant backup generator automatically engaged to provide sufficient power to shut down the facility. These two "fail safes" initiated in accordance with plant design and the approved Emergency Plan.		
				Two actionable items have been implemented: (1) Additional control system logic has been added to limit the fan loads to prevent future trips; and (2) An operating procedure is being modified and related training is being completed as an additional safeguard to further protect against a future reoccurrence.		
				Best Regards,		
				Project Team		
3	Fri 06/01/2017	Project team web mail	Jan. 6, 2017. Good afternoon: After hearing rumours yesterday about yet another fire at the DY burner that there was a recent fire i.e. another fire after the December 11 th fire, yesterday evening I wrote to a Whitby regional representative, and received confirmation that there had been a notification about a fire, but that person had already deleted it. I saw no media release posted, nor has one been posted at the writing of this	Thank you for your interest in the Durham York Energy Centre. Please be advised that your inquiry has been received and is currently being addressed by the Project Team. Once prepared, we will provide you with a detailed response to your inquiry. Regards, Project Team	Fri 06/01/2017	LW
			inquiry. Though a member of the EFW AC, I was not informed about either this recent for nor the fire that occurred December 11 th . Were any members of the EFW AC or EFW WMAC notified about either fire? Now that it's confirmed there was a third fire reported January 4 th , when and how-via what method - do you plan to inform the public? Three fires in less than three months is hardly a minor matter, irrespective of the reported comments about this being a "small" fire. Notwithstanding the lousy track record of this plagued project,	RE: Follow-up from questions received on Fri 06/01/2017 Good Morning, Please find below responses to the questions posed to DYEC project team staff on Thursday January 06, 2017.	Thurs 16/02/2017	DL

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7	Date Received	Method Received	Comment Details/Description:	Response/ Remedial Action	Response Date	Staff
			who at Durham Region decided that news about the Jan. 4 th fire was not to be shared beyond regional councillors and whoever else might have received that notification? What is the notification protocol –if any – for notifying the public and media after councillors would be notified, even if this fire had not declared "an emergency" under the Spills Contingency Emergency Response Plan? Only after a number of delegations I made to committees and councillors and the public after the October 2015 and May 2016 emissions exceedances, last September an Exceedance Notification Protocol was developed. Council asked staff to amend it to ensure it covered events occurring outside business hours e.g. holidays, weekends etc. Does a similar document exist for other types of "events" e.g. fires, or does one need to be developed for notification of fires and related? Is this covered in some regional or project document? If it is, please refer me to the exact page of any document(s) where a notification protocol i.e. notifying the public either simultaneously or after regional councillors informed - might be found. Given what emerged in Clarington yesterday, i.e. local Clar. councillor could not get information as to whether or not fire occurred and when, there should also be a notification to ALL local Clarington councillors at the same time as regional councillors would be informed. To repeat, the contact information pages in the "Spill Contingency & Emergency Response Plan" and some appendices as posted on the project website found at: https://www.durhamyorkwaste.ca/Assets/Documents/FacilityManagement/SCER P/Plan/Spill_Contingency_Emergency_Response_Plan.pdf are still out of date i.e. dated January 2014, e.g. showing name of former plant manager, not current one. This was pointed out to Durham Region in my delegation of December 14, 2016. The questions contained in my delegation were submitted formally to this inquiry/complaint address on December 21 st and I received acknowledgment, but I have not received response	Q1: Though a member of the EFW AC, I was not informed about either this recent (January 4 th) fire or the fire that occurred December 11th. Were any members of the EFW AC or EFW WMAC notified about either fire? The fire on December 11 th was the subject of a general media release, which was posted to the project website. There was no targeted communication to EFWAC members only. Anyone wishing to receive weekly updates when new material is posted to the website can subscribe online. Regarding our response to the fire on January 4, please see our response to Question #2 below. Q2: Now that it's confirmed there was a third fire reported January 4th, when and how-via what method - do you plan to inform the public? On January 4 th , Covanta's operation staff spotted smoke rising from smoldering waste which had recently been unloaded. Covanta deployed water cannons to extinguish the waste, which triggered automatic notification to the fire department. Upon arrival, the fire department confirmed that the waste was completely extinguished and left the site. Council was made aware of the incident via a memo from the Commissioner of Works, Sue Siopis. The January 4 th fire was not deemed to be significant. Events of this nature are relatively common in the industry, and the fire remained well controlled at all times and there were no exceedances and no service disruptions were experienced at the facility due to this event.		

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		In the interim, since some residents are now aware that a fire notification email was sent to regional councillors January 4, 2017 at 4:07 p.m., can this email at the very least be provided to those who signed up for project email notifications and posted on the project website?	Q3: Who at Durham Region decided that news about the Jan. 4th fire was not to be shared beyond regional councillors and whoever else might have received that notification?		
		I look forward to your reply to this inquiry as well as to one related to December 11 th	Please see response to Question #2.		
		fire, dated Dec. 21 st . Thank you.	Q4: What is the notification protocol –if any – for notifying the public and media after councillors would be notified, even if this fire had not declared "an emergency" under the Spills Contingency Emergency Response Plan		
			Please see response to Question #2.		
			Q5: Last September an Exceedance Notification Protocol was developed. Council asked staff to amend it to ensure it covered events occurring outside business hours e.g. holidays, weekends etc. Does a similar document exist for other types of "events" e.g. fires, or does one need to be developed for notification of fires and related? Is this covered in some regional or project document? If it is, please refer me to the exact page of any document(s) where a notification protocol i.e. notifying the public either simultaneously or after regional councillors informed - might be found.		
			The Region owns and operates a wide variety of facilities from water treatment plants to home's for the aged and more. When any event occurs at one of our facilities various levels of management are informed. Depending on the significance or severity of the event, senior management determines the relevant course of action, including potential public notification.		
			Q6: In the interim, since some residents are now aware that a fire notification email was sent to regional councillors January 4, 2017 at 4:07 p.m., can this email at		

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				the very least be provided to those who signed up for project email notifications and posted on the project website?		
				Subscribers sign up to receive weekly notifications when new materials are posted to the project website. The email to Councillors was not posted to the website, so no notifications were sent.		
				Best Regards,		
				Project Team		
4	Fri 06/01/2017	Project team web mail	It is my understanding that there was yet another fire at the garbage incinerator this week.	Thank you for your interest in the Durham York Energy Centre. Please be advised that your inquiry has been received	Mon 09/01/2017	LW
			Why was this not reported on the DR waste website and to the media?	and is currently being addressed by the Project Team. Once prepared, we will provide you with a detailed response to your inquiry.		
			What happened to the "transparency" we were promised, or has that too gone up in flames?	Regards,		
			The public by virtue of being regional taxpayers own this facility, and we have a right to know about fires, operations, costs and air quality.	Project Team		
			Why did someone (at the Region?) decide that it was a 'small' fire and not worth	RE: Follow-up from questions received on Fri 06/01/2017	Thurs 16/02/2017	DL
			telling the public about it? And under what authority?	Good Morning,	10/02/2017	
			I further understand that Mayors and Regional Councillors across DR were notified. Why would Local Councillors (especially in Clarington) not be duly notified; this is a	Please find below responses to the questions posed to DYEC project team staff on Thursday January 06, 2017.		

serious and continuing occurrence, and the public and all of our elected

representatives deserve to know what is taking place.

Q1: It is my understanding that there was yet another fire

On January 4th, Covanta's operation staff spotted smoke rising

at the garbage incinerator this week. Why was this not reported on the DR waste website and to the media?

from smoldering waste which had recently been unloaded. Covanta deployed water cannons to extinguish the waste,

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				which triggered automatic notification to the fire department. Upon arrival, the fire department confirmed that the waste was completely extinguished and left the site.		
				Council was made aware of the incident via a memo from the Commissioner of Works, Sue Siopis. The January 4 th fire was not deemed to be significant. Events of this nature are relatively common in the industry, and the fire remained well controlled at all times and there were no exceedances and no service disruptions were experienced at the facility due to this event.		
				Q2: What happened to the "transparency" we were promised, or has that too gone up in flames?		
				The Region is committed to providing timely information on matters of significant concern to the public. As noted in our previous response, this event was judged to be of low significance.		
				Q3: Why did someone (at the Region?) decide that it was a 'small' fire and not worth telling the public about it? And under what authority?		
				Please see response to Question #1 – the fire was extinguished before the arrival of the fire department. No actual flames were seen, rather just some smoke to which operating staff applied water to. The fire department staff observed the waste in the pit and concluded there was no fire so they left the facility.		
				Q4: I further understand that Mayors and Regional Councillors across DR were notified. Why would Local		

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				Councillors (especially in Clarington) not be duly notified? The Mayors and Regional Councillors also sit on their respective local councils, and can notify their local councils if they deem this to be necessary. Best Regards, Project Team		
5	Tue 10/01/2017	Project team web mail	Good morning: I have the following questions. When will EFW WMAC 2017 meeting schedule be posted & when will next EFW AC meeting be called? 1) Re EFW AC https://www.durhamyorkwaste.ca/PublicOutreach/EFWAC/UpcomingMeetings.aspx The only 2016 EFW AC meeting was held on: Wednesday, March 16 2:30 to 4:30 PM Durham Region Headquarters, Room LL-C	Good Afternoon, Please be advised that your question has been received and is currently being addressed by the DYEC project team. Once prepared, we will provide you with a detailed response to your questions. Regards, Project Team	Tue 10/01/2017	DL
			From the EFW AC Terms of Reference: Mandate Pursuant to Condition 8 of the Minister of the Environment's (Minister) Notice of Approval, the purpose of the EFWAC is to ensure that concerns about the design, construction and operation of the undertaking are considered and mitigation measures are implemented where appropriate by the Proponent. The Mandate of the EFWAC is to: Provide a balanced, inclusive discussion and forum for stakeholders to provide advice to the Project Team. To serve as a formal mechanism to exchange ideas and concerns related to the EFW project. Staff indicated an EFW AC meeting would be held after the May 2016 stack tests, during which tests Covanta emissions for dioxins exceeded the permitted limit, for the second time. A potential meeting was set for either June 21 –advised June 17 th	RE: Follow-up from questions received on Tue 10/01/2017 Good Morning, Please find below responses to the questions posed to DYEC project team staff on Tuesday January 10, 2017. Q1: When will EFW WMAC 2017 meeting schedule be posted? The 2017 EFW-WMAC meeting schedule has been confirmed and is posted on the DYEC website. Q2: When will next EFW AC meeting be called?	Thurs 16/02/2017	DL

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			that would not happen and re July meeting – see series of emails below between and	The next EFWAC will follow after the annual report has been submitted.		
			Note receipt of this message was acknowledged. The stated update to be received was not provided that I could determine. In several messages over the last six	Best Regards,		
			months and in conversations with Durham's Waste director, I asked when the next EFW AC meeting would be held.	Project Team		
			To date I have received no response regarding future EFW AC meetings. EFW AC members were informed of the first fire at the incinerator on October 11, 2016, , but not of the two subsequent fires December 11, 2016 and January 4 th 2017.			
			Given that there have been three fires in the last three months at the incinerator on top of two stack test reports released last week as well as several reports detailing issues around the May 2016 dioxins exceedance, it's high time an EFW AC meeting was called so that some of these could be addressed by the EFW AC.			
			2) EFW WMAC 2017 meeting schedule			
			No meeting schedule for 2017 has yet been posted, though when EFW WMAC met Nov. 16, 2016, staff was to contact members with options to set new meeting schedule – see page 4 of attached Nov. 16.16 minutes which I can only find within Jan. 11.16 COW agenda-not yet posted on WMAC Nov. meeting page. The committee is to meet quarterly and 2017 would be the final year of the current two year term.			
			Given that there have been three fires in the last three months at the incinerator on top of two stack test reports released last week, surely the EFW WMAC committee could turn their attention to setting a meeting schedule so that they and the public, whose concerns they are supposed to be available to hear, could get on with doing the committee's business.			
			It is essential that both EFW committees meet on a regular basis and be permitted to have the opportunity to fulfill their respective mandates.			
			Recall that one key difference between the functioning of EFW AC and the EFW			

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			WMAC is that the EFW AC, via Condition 8 of EA approval, ensures that representatives of the three community groups who actively monitored and productively participated in the EA review would be members of the committee and in fact, these public members have been the active participants at the EFW AC meetings.			
			In contrast, members of EFW WMAC are political appointees – 5 by Durham Region council and 4 by Clarington Council, who, with ONE exception, have limited or no history of having actively monitored the incinerator project.			
			Please advise when the EFW WMAC 2017 meeting schedule will be posted.			
			Please advise when EFW AC members would be canvassed for availability for the next meeting at the earliest opportunity.			
			Thank you.			
6	Wed 08/02/2017	Durham Regional Council	Delegation regarding the DYEC first year-end reconciliation. Delegate expressed concerns with the first year annual reconciliation being a decision of the Management Committee and believes that Council has an obligation to review and ensure Covanta's invoice and Management Committee's reconciliation are appropriate. The delegate also stressed that Covanta's public outreach should include interaction with any of the Region's Energy from Waste – Waste Management Advisory Committees.	No further action required by staff.	N/A	N/A
7	Tue 14/02/2017	Project team web mail	To Whom It May Concern: I have interest in learning more about the technology being used at your Clarington facility.	Good Morning, This email is in response to your email sent on Tuesday February 14, 2016. Please see below responses to your questions regarding the Durham York Energy Centre (DYEC).	Wed 15/02/2017	DL
			I have two questions:1) Is this technology essentially a gasification system? The reason I'm asking is the 1,000 degree temperature you're hitting.	1) Is this technology essentially a gasification system? The reason I'm asking is the 1,000 degree temperature you're hitting.		
			2) Has the ash emission issue been dealt with so the system the system can operate at 100% capacity now? I know one year ago it was still at the preliminary approval in its operations.	The DYEC is not a gasification system. The DYEC uses thermal mass burn technology which uses municipal solid waste (MSW) as a fuel. Unlike gasification which uses little to		

	Inquiries						
#	Date Received	Method Received	Comment Details/Description:	Response/ Remedial Action	Response Date	Staff	
			Thank you kindly for your response to my request. Congratulations by the way in moving forward on this "green" solution to dealing with waste and making electricity.	no oxygen to produce a usable synthetic gas, the DYEC burns MSW using high levels of oxygen (6% to 10%) in a combustion process to form heat to produce high-pressure steam, which is then used to generate electricity. Waste is only introduced into the combustion chamber once the temperature reaches 1,000 degrees centigrade to ensure complete combustion of the MSW and destruction of volatile organic compounds. Our typical operating temperature is between 1100 and 1200 C. 2) Has the ash emission issue been dealt with so the system the system can operate at 100% capacity now? I know one year ago it was still at the preliminary approval in its operations. The ash issue you are referring to was not an 'emission' limit, rather it was an ash quantity issue. The original limit of 30% ash quantity was an estimate based on industry standards for raw, untreated quantities of bottom and fly ash. The DYEC facility actually treats our fly ash on site to render it non-hazardous prior to removal. That environmentally beneficial fly ash treatment process adds cement, pozzolon and water which increases the mass of the fly ash and was the reason the ash quantity limit was marginally exceeded during the Acceptance Test. To account for the increased quantity the limit was raised from 30% to 35%. As a result all bottom and fly ash leaving the facility are non-hazardous. The DYEC started Commercial Operations on January 29, 2016 and received final Acceptance Certificate on November 23, 2016. The facility processed approximately 129,000 tonnes of garbage in 2016, while recovering approximately 3,600 tonnes of metal and generating approximately 90,000 MWh of electricity for sale to the provincial grid. The latest independent stack test to monitor all emissions from the stack was completed in November 2016 and illustrates that the facility is currently operating well within the DYEC			

Inquiries Response Method **Date Comment Details/Description: Response/ Remedial Action** Staff Date Received Received environmental compliance approval requirements. Thank you for your interest in the Durham York Energy Centre. Regards, Project Team I am searching for the Air Zone report on the Oct-Nov 2016 regulatory stack tests Good Afternoon Project team web MJ Wed Wed 15/02/2017 which were done at the facility. 15/02/2017 mail We are still waiting for this report. Was AirZone present for all the test dates and events and has the Air Zone report been completed? When can I expect it to be made available to the public? Will it be posted on the website, and if so, where, and will notification be given? Regards . Please let me know when you hear anything about it or about Thank you possible completion.

	Inquiries							
#	Date Received	Method Received	Comment Details/Description:	Response/ Remedial Action	Response Date	Staff		
Tot	al Project Te	eam Inquiries th	nis month (project web email/telephone):	7				
Tot	Total Covanta Inquiries this month:			0				
Tot	al Council/ (Committee Inqu	iries this month:	1				
Tot	Total Durham Call Centre Inquiries this month (separate attachment):			0				
Tot	Total Inquiries from York this month:			0				
Tot	Total Inquiries from previous months:			1				
Tot	Total Inquiries in 2017:			9				

	Complaints					
#	Date Received	Method Received	Comment Details/Description:	Response/ Remedial Action	Response Date	Staff
Tot	al Project To	eam Complain	ts this month (project web email/telephone):	0		
Tot	al Covanta (Complaints thi	is month:	0		
Tot	al Council/ (Committee Co	mplaints this month:	0		
Tot	Total Durham Call Centre Complaints this month (separate attachment):			0		
Tot	Total Complaints from York this month:			0		
Tot	Total Complaints from previous months:			1		
Tot	al Compla	ints in 2017:		1		